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Abstract It probably should not be surprising, in this
time of soaring medical costs and proliferating
technology, that an intense debate has arisen over
the concept of medical futility. Should doctors be
doing all the things they are doing? In particular,
should they be attempting treatments that have little
likelihood of achieving the goals of medicine? What
are the goals of medicine? Can we agree when
medical treatment fails to achieve such goals? What
should the physician do and not do under such
circumstances? Exploring these issues has forced us
to revisit the doctor-patient relationship and the
relationship of the medical profession to society in a
most fundamental way. Medical futility has both a
quantitative and qualitative component. I maintain
that medical futility is the unacceptable likelihood of
achieving an effect that the patient has the capacity to
appreciate as a benefit. Both emphasized terms are
important. A patient is neither a collection of organs
nor merely an individual with desires. Rather, a
patient (from the word “to suffer”) is a person who
seeks the healing (meaning “to make whole”) powers
of the physician. The relationship between the two is
central to the healing process and the goals of
medicine. Medicine today has the capacity to achieve
a multitude of effects, raising and lowering blood
pressure, speeding, slowing, and even removing and
replacing the heart, to name but a minuscule few. But
none of these effects is a benefit unless the patient has
at the very least the capacity to appreciate it. Sadly, in
the futility debate wherein some critics have failed or
refused to define medical futility an important area of
medicine has in large part been neglected, not only in
treatment decisions at the bedside, but in public
discussions—comfort care—the physician’so b l i g a t i o n
to alleviate suffering, enhance well being and support
the dignity of the patient in the last few days of life.
Keywords Medicalfutility.Comfortcare.
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Defining Medical Futility and Improving
End-of-Life Care
Here is a scenario familiar to just about everyone
engaged in critical care. A fifty-six-year-old woman is
admitted to the ICU with dyspnea, extreme weakness,
and cachexia from metastatic lung cancer. She is
placed on a ventilator and vasopressor infusion to
maintain her blood pressure. The health care team
wants to write a Do Not Attempt Resuscitation
(DNAR) order because, in their judgment, attempted
CPR in the event of cardiac arrest—even if it did
temporarily restore cardiac function—would be futile,
since it would not fulfill a fundamental goal of their
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would permit her to survive outside the acute hospital
setting. They believe the appropriate goal of treatment
now is comfort care. However, her treatment wishes
cannot be determined, and her family, in hopes of a
miraculous cure, demand all possible life-sustaining
treatments—including attempted CPR—if the patient
undergoes a cardiac arrest.
Should the physicians follow the family’sw i s h e st o
continue aggressive life-sustaining treatment including
attempted CPR, or should the physicians refuse by
invoking medical futility and seek to engage the family
in emphasizing comfort care? What does it mean to
invoke medical futility?
Although the concept of medical futility, to judge
from ancient documents, is as old as medicine itself, the
topic became particularly contentious over the last few
decades. Some critics argued that medical futility could
notbemeaningfullydefined,evencallingforthetermto
be expunged from the medical lexicon (Truog et al.
1992). As one early critic acknowledged, however:
“Those who call for the abandonment of the
concept have no substitute to offer. They persist
in making decisions with, more or less, covert
definitions. The common sense notion that a
time does come for all of us when death or
disability exceeds our medical powers cannot be
denied. This means that some operative way of
making a decision when ‘enough is enough’ is
necessary. It is a mark of our mortality that we
shall die. For each of us some determination of
futility by any other name will become a reality”
(Pellegrino 2005, 4).
The Foundation and Components
of Medical Futility
It probably should not be surprising, in this time of
soaring medical costs and proliferating technology,
that an intense debate has arisen over the concept of
medical futility. Should doctors be doing all the things
they are doing? In particular, should they be attempt-
ing treatments that have little likelihood of achieving
the goals of medicine? What are the goals of
medicine? Can we agree when medical treatment fails
to achieve such goals? What should the physician do
and not do under such circumstances? Exploring these
issues has forced us to revisit the doctor–patient
relationship and the relationship of the medical
profession to society in a most fundamental way.
If we look up the word “futility” in the Oxford
English Dictionary, we learn that it means, “leaky,
vain, failing of the desired end through intrinsic
defect.” What then is “failing of the desired end” in
the case of medical futility?
Quantitative and Qualitative Medical Futility
Medical futility has both a quantitative and qualitative
component.FromthewritingsoftheHippocraticcorpus
wederiveaquantitativenotion:“Whenevertheillnessis
too strong for the available remedies, the physician
surely must not expect that it can be overcome by
medicine … To attempt futile treatment is to display an
ignorance that is allied to madness” (Hippocratic
Corpus in Reiser, Dyck, and Curran 1977).
There is also a qualitative aspect to medical futility
that we can trace back to Plato’s Republic where we
find these statements: “For those whose lives are
always in a state of inner sickness Asclepius [who was
a legendary, indeed divine, physician] did not attempt
to prescribe a regime to make their life a prolonged
misery … A life with preoccupation with illness and
neglect of work is not worth living” (Plato 1981).
Quantitative Futility
To pursue first the quantitative aspect of medical
futility, I draw your attention to the uncertainty
inherent to the practice of medicine. Every medical
student learns to “never say never.” Philosophers such
as David Hume and Karl Popper have pointed out that
even though one sees B follow A a hundred or a
thousand or even a million times, one can never be
absolutely certain that the same thing will happen
again (Popper 1961).
1 Nevertheless, as reasonable
1 With respect to the “idol of certainty,” Popper states: “The old
scientific ideal of episteme—of absolutely certain, demonstra-
ble knowledge—has proved to be an idol. The demand for
scientific objectivity makes it inevitable that every scientific
statement must remain tentative forever. It may indeed be
corroborated, but every corroboration is relative to other
statements which, again, are tentative. Only in our subjective
experiences of conviction, in our subjective faith, can we be
‘absolutely certain’” (1961, 280; italics in the original).
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about likely causality at some point in our observa-
tions. Similarly, if B has never followed A after many
events, at some point we begin to draw conclusions
about the unlikelihood of B following A, although
again we can never be absolutely certain. This kind of
commonsense empirical reasoning forms the basis for
our daily living activities. More particularly it is the
basis for the clinical practice of medicine. To those
who demand, “Are you absolutely certain?” the answer
is always, “No.” But the correct question is: How
many times and to what degree do we have to fail
before we agree to call a treatment futile? In medicine,
as in our daily affairs, we act on the basis of empirical
evidence. And so to overcome the paralysis of
uncertainty that has forced physicians to pursue the
most unlikely treatments, Nancy Jecker, Albert Jonsen,
and I proposed what is nothing more than a common-
sense definition of futility (Schneiderman et al. 1990).
Most of us probably would agree that if a treatment
has not worked in the last 100 cases, almost certainly
it is not going to work if it is tried again. (Statisticians
can calculate that the upper limit of the 95%
Confidence Interval is 3%.) The experience of 100
cases is attainable in many areas of medicine. This
proposal is not an “objective” or “value-free” defini-
tion, but rather one that seeks reasonable consensus
where absolute certainty is impossible and therapeutic
benefit is the goal. If we can agree to call this
treatment futile, then the ordinary duty of the
physician does not require offering it.
2
The medical community, or society at large, may
prefer longer (or shorter) odds, but in the end we all will
have to accept some empirical notion of medical futility
or else throw all commonsense to the wind. In other
words, we have to remember the denominator. If you
trulywanttomakeacaseforattemptingaggressive,life-
sustaining, rib-cracking CPR on a patient who has a
“one ina hundred chance” ofworking,you are claiming
that it is appropriate to subject ninety-nine patients to an
intervention that is painful, burdensome, and almost
certainly useless in pursuit of one possible rare success.
This violates medicine’s duty to avoid unnecessary
harm and the ethical duty of proportionality. Any
physician who knowingly prescribed a drug with such
a low therapeutic ratio and such severe side effects
would be (deservedly) vulnerable to the charge of
medical malpractice.
Indeed, our proposed quantitative threshold is
similar to that used in the statistical evaluation of
clinical trials, which compares treatment observations
against the null hypothesis (no difference) in light of
the conclusion that these observations have a one in
twenty chance of being nonsignificant (p=0.05) or,
more conservatively, a one in 100 chance of being
nonsignificant (p=0.01). One can never be certain,
even in large-scale studies, that a treatment is
beneficial (better than no treatment or an alternative
treatment); therefore, one submits observations to the
test of reasonableness. A good example of the
application of our quantitative proposal is the publi-
cation of a Basic Life Support guideline based on
empirical outcomes of out-of-hospital attempted CPR
whose recommendation for terminating efforts fol-
lowed the quantitative threshold we proposed (Sasson
et al. 2008). The notion of reasonableness is accepted
in another major sector of society where a person’s
life may be at stake: American courts of law. In the
United States, a jury in a criminal trial may find a
defendant guilty and subject to the death penalty if the
evidence is persuasive not beyond all doubt, but
beyond a reasonable doubt.
Qualitative Futility
I maintain that medical futility is the unacceptable
likelihood of achieving an effect that the patient has
the capacity to appreciate as a benefit. Both empha-
sized terms are important. A patient is neither a
collection of organs nor merely an individual with
desires. Rather, a patient (from the word “to suffer”)
is a person who seeks the healing (meaning “to make
whole”) powers of the physician. The relationship
between the two is central to the healing process and
the goals of medicine. Medicine today has the
capacity to achieve a multitude of effects, raising
and lowering blood pressure, speeding, slowing, and
even removing and replacing the heart, to name but a
minuscule few. But none of these effects is a benefit
unless the patient has at the very least the capacity to
appreciate it, a circumstance that is impossible if the
patient is permanently unconscious.
My colleagues Albert Jonsen and Nancy Jecker
and I also adopted the notion attributed by Plato to
2 This argument is presented in more detail in Schneiderman
and Jecker (2011).
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patient from being “preoccupied” with the illness and
incapable of achieving any other life goal that
treatment should also be regarded as futile. Hence, if
the best outcome physicians can achieve to maintain
survival requires keeping the patient perpetually
confined to the Intensive Care Unit or the acute care
hospital setting, that outcome should not be regarded
as a success, but rather as a failure to achieve the
goals of medicine. Such treatment, by our definition,
is also futile (Schneiderman et al. 1990).
It is important that we make clear to society as
well as to the profession that medicine has great
powers, but not unlimited powers. The medical
profession has important obligations, but not unlim-
ited obligations. Failing to seek a precise definition
of medical futility only leaves us in a state of
ambiguity, which encourages the very abuses many
people fear. Physicians should not be free to invoke
medical futility unless they can justify it before their
peers with good evidence-based data and before
society with professional standards of practice. This
requires that we examine the notion, not hide from it.
Medical Futility: Seeking a Contemporary
Definition
A number of alternative definitions have been entered
in the medical futility debate. One proposed definition
holds that medical futility should depend upon the
likelihood of achieving the patient’s goals. In other
words, the patient is entitled to receive any treatment
and seek any outcome he or she wishes from the
physician. This view has arisen out of the patient
autonomy movement in reaction to abuses that took
place in the previous era of strong physician pater-
nalism. And although in many respects it is an
admirable view, it is clearly flawed. Physicians are
not obligated to yield, for example, to a patient’s
desire for mutilating or useless surgery. Indeed,
surgeons make futility decisions every day simply
by refusing requests to operate on a patient they deem
“inoperable.” If the patient’s goal is to become a
world champion bodybuilder with the aid of anabolic
steroids, the physician is neither ethically obligated
nor legally permitted to comply with the body-
builder’s request. These are but a few—there are
many other—instances of limitations and prohibitions
on the physician’s duty to achieve the patient’s goal.
A particularly important limitation, in this era of Life-
as-a-TV-Movie of the Week, is that the physician does
not owe the patient a miracle.
Anotherproposeddefinitionofmedicalfutilityhasto
do with the unacceptable likelihood of prolonging life.
Physicians, according to this notion, cannot declare a
treatment futile as long as it can prolong life, even
permanently unconscious life. Those who make this
claim are probably unaware that the obligation of
physicians to prolong life is not supported by the
classical tradition of medicine (Amudsen 1978).
InancientGreeceandRome, asexpressed particularly
through the Hippocratic writings, the physician’s duties
were described as assisting nature to restore health and
alleviatesuffering.Lifeanddeathwereviewedasnatural
cycles. Indeed, the Hippocratic physician shunned
claims of supernatural powers in order to avoid the taint
of charlatanism. It was not until many centuries later in
the late Middle Ages, when religion began to play a
dominant role in Western Europe, and later in the
seventeenth century, when scientists began to view
science as a power to be exerted against nature, that
the goal of prolonging life was introduced. It is
important to keep in mind, however, that neither
theologians, nor scientists, nor for that matter anyone
else prior to the modern era could ever imagine life in
the many forms it comes today, the many states
between health and death that are the outcomes of
modern medical treatments. The diagnosis of persistent
vegetative state, to name just one condition, was not
coined until 1972 (Jennett and Plum 1972). Thus, the
claim that the goal of medicine is to preserve life has
ambiguous meanings and dubious roots in the historical
tradition of the profession.
Another proposal is that the definition of medical
futility should be limited to the unacceptable likeli-
hood of achieving any physiological effect on the
body. According to this proposal, the physician cannot
regard a treatment as futile as long as it can maintain
the function of any part of the body, such as pumping
blood by means of cardiac compression, moving air
by means of mechanical ventilation, or eliminating
wastes via dialysis, even if the patient is permanently
unconscious or in the last moments of a terminal
condition. In short, the instruments of technology are
the focus of attention rather than the patient. This
definition, physiologic futility, has been presented as
a “value-neutral” definition (Truog et al. 1992). That
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how much modern medicine has lost its way, how
much it has become fragmented by subspecialties and
technology. To specify narrow physiological objec-
tives as the goals of medical practice is not “value
neutral,” but a value choice that is about as far from
the patient-centered tradition of the medical profes-
sion as it is possible to be.
Furthermore, the focus on physiologic measures is
also proving to be dangerous. For example, many
diabetes specialists promoted strict control of blood
glucose on the assumption that producing a physio-
logical effect (lowering blood glucose) was equivalent
to achieving a benefit for the patient (preventing
complications and prolonging life). Well designed
randomized control trials examining patient outcomes
showed that strict control failed to reduce adverse
cardiovascular outcomes and either increased or had
no effect on mortality; moreover, it increased the risk
for severe hypoglycemia in type 2 diabetes (Gerstein
et al. 2008; Duckworth et al. 2009; Patel et al. 2008;
Kellyetal.2009; Wiener et al. 2008). Another example
of effect-benefit confusion that proved harmful, even
fatal, occurred when physicians imprudently began
prescribing erythropoietin, a red cell growth factor, to
raise blood levels to a “normal” range in anemic
patients with cancer and chronic kidney disease. Once
again, this physiological effect was assumed to be
beneficial. Unfortunately, the treatment resulted in
significantly more harms to patients, including stroke,
heart attack, hospitalization, and death (Unger et al.
2010; Singh et al. 2006;D r u c k ee ta l .2006).
Exceptions and Cautions
Although seeking to define and delineate the ethical
implications of medical futility as precisely as
possible, I acknowledge that medical practice calls
upon us to recognize certain exceptions and cautions.
If the physician has the right to withhold a futile
treatment, does this mean the physician enjoys the
privilege of withholding discussion about such treat-
ment? Certainly physicians do not describe to patients
all the many tests and treatments they have no
intention of pursuing. In my view, however, an
important distinction should be made between treat-
ment and information. Depending on the context and
the patient’s state of mind, patients may be entitled to
information even though they are not entitled to
treatments. Obviously, a physician need not discuss
the remote possibility of brain surgery with every
patient who has a headache. On the other hand, any
patient in the Intensive Care Unit today, having
watched television, is quite aware that attempted
CPR is one of the possible treatment options. In this
setting it seems to me quite clear that physicians owe
it to the patient to discuss whether or not attempted
CPR will be offered. Making a decision that a
treatment is medically futile does not absolve the
physician of the obligation to discuss and inform the
patient/surrogate about what is going on in terms of
the patient’s condition, prognosis, and treatment
options. But it would be a mistake to create an
exchange that in effect has the physician advising the
patient: “Attempting CPR would be of no use in
treating your disease at this point. Do you want us to
do it?” Such a communication sends a meaningless,
even contradictory, message, which leads to confusion
and distrust in the patient (Tomlinson and Brody
1990). Rather than assisting the patient in exercising
autonomy, it actually deceives the patient and pre-
vents the full exercise of autonomy.
What about the terminally ill patient who requests
attempted CPR in hopes of surviving for one last visit
from a distant loved one hastening to the bedside?
Even though the physician is convinced that the
intervention would have almost no chance of keeping
the patient alive more than a day or so in the ICU,
clearly the physician will want to make a compas-
sionate exception to accommodate the short-term goal
of the patient. It is important, however, to distinguish
this compassionate act from an obligatory act. The
physician can easily make a compassionate exception
in the case of a severely burned patient or a patient
with metastatic cancer whose request for treatment
will result only in a brief prolongation of dying (a
clear and limited goal and small exception to the
physician’s ordinary duty). But in the case of
permanent vegetative state, obligating the physician
to accede to a request for long-term life maintenance
could lead to unaccounted decades of futile treatment.
In contrast to those who raise fears about the erosion
in value of the patient, giving the physician the
opportunity to view each patient as a unique person in
unique circumstances enhances the value of the
patient. It encourages the use of appropriate medical
measures rather than useless, thoughtless pursuit of
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patient is never futile.
Beyond Futility to an Ethic of Care
In ancient Greece, the futtilis was a religious vessel that
had a wide top and a narrow bottom. This peculiar
shape caused the vessel to tip over easily, which made it
of no practical use for anything other than ceremonial
occasions. The root of the term reminds us that words
have a mythical power as well as a literal meaning. Is it
not possible that unrealistic expectations and unreason-
able demands for futile treatments, such as attempted
CPR in a cancer patient with barely hours to live, may
be expressions of deep ritualistic needs? These actions
in our modern time have become almost religious
ceremonies. Indeed, it is not too extreme to point out
that in the past when patients sought a miracle they
went to church and prayed to God; today they come to
the hospital and demand it of the physician. Therefore,
it is important to emphasize again: physicians are not
obligated to produce a miracle. And, equally important,
there are better actions that loved ones can seek and
participate in that serve their needs to express love and
veneration. This is called comfort care. Sadly, in the
futility debate this important area has in large part been
neglected, not only in treatment decisions at the
bedside, but in public discussions—the physician’s
obligation to alleviate suffering, enhance well being,
and support the dignity of the patient in the last few
days of life (Schneiderman et al. 1994).
Ibelieveitisimportantthatthefutilitydebate,bothin
public and at the bedside, be expanded beyond “pull the
plug” decisions to include more attention to improving
doctors’ involvement in the details of end-of-life care,
so that they do not say they have “nothing to offer” and
walk away leaving the “nursing care” to nurses as
seemingly beneath their attention. Patients and families
who demand that “everything be done” may well be
expressing a subtext: “Do not abandon me.”
The Heuristic Value of Defining Medical Futility
There is an important heuristic value to the search for
a clear definition of medical futility, whatever one
emerges (Schneiderman and Jecker 1993). First of all,
the futility debate has already resulted in more clarity
of thinking, particularly in distinguishing medical
futility from rationing (Jecker and Schneiderman
1992). Often these two concepts are entangled when
expensive treatments are being administered to
patients in the ICU; more often they are confused.
For the sake of clarity I propose that medical futility
signifies that a treatment offers no therapeutic benefit
to a patient. Rationing specifically acknowledges that
at r e a t m e n tdoes offer a benefit, and the issue
becomes how to distribute beneficial but limited
resources fairly. To clarify the distinction further:
futility decisions are made at the bedside of a specific
patient, whereas rationing decisions, involving cate-
gories of patients or treatments or circumstances,
inevitably should be made at a policy level in order to
assure just distribution of resources.
Second, I believe that pursuing a clear-cut concept
of medical futility will encourage a more aggressive
search for precisely the kind of evidence-based
information that our medical enthusiasm has caused
us to overlook. I refer to the publication of clinical
trials that report not only treatments that are successful,
but also treatments that are unsuccessful. Both kinds of
data are important to the practice of medicine; both
provide guidelines for physician choice.
Third, empirical studies as well as consensus
agreements form the basis for establishing standards
of practice. These standards of practice should be
declared openly as policies by medical centers and
organizations of medicine for the information of the
public and as guidelines to the courts. This last point is
extremely important. Many patients and patients’
families have been forced to endure and pay for
inhumane, unwanted care either because of an indi-
vidual physician’s misguided notions of medical duty
or because of hospital administrators’ fears of inflam-
matory media coverage. Many physicians practice
“defensive medicine,” fearing that anything less than
mindless continuation of aggressive treatments would
make them legally vulnerable. As a consequence, they
have given the courts little guidance but to “do
everything possible,” which, by default and against
all common sense, becomes the standard of practice.
Establishing Standards of Practice
Futility policies, like all institutional policies, attempt
to bridge the gap between the cultures of medicine
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lawyers trying to say medical things. In the United
States, at the federal level, the Uniform Health-Care
Decisions Act states: “A health-care provider or
institution may decline to comply with an individual
instruction or health-care decision that requires
medically ineffective health care or health care
contrary to generally accepted health-care standards
applicable to the health-care provider or institution”
(Uniform Health-Care Decisions Act 1994, section 7,
subsection f). It further clarifies that “medically
ineffective” health care means “treatment which
would not offer the patient any significant benefit”
(Uniform Health-Care Decisions Act 1994, comment
on section 7, subsection f). This statute has already
been adopted by more than a half dozen states. In
addition,professionalsocieties—includingtheAmerican
Medical Association, the Society for Critical Care
Medicine, and the American Thoracic Society—have
published guidelines on medical futility.
Working groups of professionals and laypersons
throughout the country have started to develop
consensus-based futility hospital policies (Halevy
and Brod 1996; Murphy and Barbour 1994; BANEC
Nonbeneficial Treatment Working Group 1999). I led
one such consensus conference. In order to keep it—
in that much-maligned phrase—“fair and balanced,” I
asked a professor of law, Alexander Capron, who
opposed the concept of medical futility, to be my co-
chair (Schneiderman and Capron 2000). There were
seventy-four participants, consisting of physicians,
attorneys, judges, and nurses, members of the clergy,
social workers, and community representatives, rep-
resenting ethics committee members from thirty-nine
hospitals. The participants came from northern and
southern California, from religious and secular insti-
tutions, from academic, managed care, and commu-
nity hospitals, and from within and without the health
care profession.
Contrary to the claim of some critics that the
concept of futility could not be meaningfully defined,
most of the participating hospitals independently
crafted similar definitions of the term. During the
proceedings I observed that physicians tended to seek
specific and descriptive definitions of futile, inappro-
priate, or burdensome treatments. By contrast, law-
yers and judges were more concerned about putting in
place detailed procedures that protect vulnerable
patients. I concluded that policies on futility should
provide both specific definitions and a well described
dispute resolution process that will bear scrutiny by
outside, impartial observers.
When cases come to court, and on appeal to higher
courts, it will be judges who decide whether profes-
sional judgment is in line with society’s expectations.
Judges will ask: Where does the medical profession
stand? What standards does it profess? And, most
tellingly, how does it behave?
Hospitals are likely to find the legal system willing
(even eager) to defer to well defined and procedurally
scrupulous processes for internal resolutions of futility
disputes. Although courts are capable of providing
due process protections, judges are largely unfamiliar
with the complexity of medical treatment and are
neither expected nor even able to follow up medical
outcomes once they have entered judgment; it is the
physicians seeking to cease futile treatment—and not
the judges who are called upon to rule on the case—
who have to live with the decision. For example, a
judge who assigns a guardian and orders that a
severely disabled child be kept alive rarely sees
firsthand the long-term consequences of that decision,
which remain a continuing vivid experience for the
health professionals who must provide care for the
child.
At the California conference neither the policies
themselves nor the conference participants reached
unanimous agreement on how to handle futility issues,
and a follow-up survey 1 year after the conference
revealed very few changes in the hospital futility
policies. Does that mean that the questions, “Where
does the medical profession stand? What standards
does it profess?” cannot be answered? Is it necessary
there be unanimous agreement in order to establish a
professional standard of practice? Not at all, since the
law does not demand unanimous agreement among
professionals regarding issues that are matters of
professional judgment. Differing standards are accept-
able when some physicians hold one view and others
another, provided each is held by at least a
“respectable minority” and not just an individual
practitioner.
Almost all of the futility policies agreed that
physicians are not obligated to continue life-
sustaining treatment of patients who have reliably
been determined to be permanently unconscious. If
this standard were recognized as the majority stan-
dard, one would still need to acknowledge that a
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such an explicit policy statement.
In my view, however, these latter hospitals should
consider the obligations and actions associated with
their position. Is it a position or merely the absence of
a position? Specifically, are these hospitals willing to
accept the transfer of a permanently unconscious
patient or others for whom another hospital has
deemed further life-sustaining treatment futile? If so,
disputes over end-of-life treatments could be resolved
without requiring hospitals to go to court.
If the decision to forgo treatment has been reached
by a process that is careful both in medical and
procedural terms, including full discussion (where
possible) with the patient or family, ethics committee
review, and adequate aid to the patient and family in
seeking care elsewhere, health care providers should
not seek prior permission from the courts to carry out
their professional duties. Indeed, there is substantial
legal history in the United States to show that courts
are more likely to support physicians who refrain
from providing non-beneficial treatment and then
defend their decisions as consistent with professional
standards than when they seek advance permission to
withhold such treatment. Judges do not want to make
“medical decisions.” In fact, they will rightly point
out that they are being asked to agree to end life-
sustaining treatment some time in the future when the
patient’s condition may have changed. If the rightness
of that action is questioned after the fact, judges will
want to know the answer to the third question, “How
does the medical profession behave?” Thus, health
care professionals need not only to develop policies
but also to act in accordance with their policies. They
also need to justify, through discussion and publica-
tion, their conduct in dealing with situations that have
presented the issue of the limits of professional
obligations when treatment does not yield results that
would be regarded as beneficial by most patients and
consistent with the goals of medicine (Schneiderman
and Jecker 2011).
Back to the patient, the fifty-six-year-old woman
admitted to the ICU. The health care team spent
several days with the rest of the family in order to
make a reasonable accommodation to their needs to
grieve and come to terms with the patient’s dying.
The hospital has a policy that defines medically futile
treatment and outlines steps to take in the event of a
dispute between parties involved in decision-making.
The policy defines futile treatment as “any treatment
that has no realistic chance of providing an effect that
the patient would ever have the capacity to appreciate
as a benefit, such as merely preserving the physio-
logic functions of a permanently unconscious patient,
or has no realistic chance of achieving the medical
goal of returning the patient to a level of health that
permits survival outside the acute care setting of the
medical center.” The policy also states: “It should be
emphasized that although a particular treatment may
be futile, palliative or comfort care is never futile.”
After mediation efforts failed to resolve the dispute,
the family was given a date at which time anyone who
wished could be present with the patient in a private
setting when all life support and monitors would be
withdrawn. This date gave them sufficient time to seek
transfer of the patient or court intervention—which
they chose not to do. Because the patient was
ventilator- and vasopressor-dependent, the physicians
could reasonably predict the patient would not linger.
With the aid of benzodiazepines and morphine, she
died peacefully in the presence of her family, who
seemed relieved in the end that the physicians had
assumed responsibility for this difficult decision.
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permits any noncommercial use, distribution, and reproduction
in any medium, provided the original author(s) and source are
credited.
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